{"resourceId":"netapp-aide-known-limitations-docs-20261029","versions":[{"version":"external-352c4832605f0f8870305c84b01eb3ec771bbdc9faa29727d60dc2a2e3d2a3fc","resource":{"id":"netapp-aide-known-limitations-docs-20261029","title":"NetApp documents AI Data Engine known limitations: no single-to-multi-node migration, restricted proxy support, limited policy actions and narrow MCP search","organization":"NetApp (product documentation)","sector":"Strategic partner: AI data infrastructure and data management","geography":"Global","publishedAt":"Documentation page dated 10/29/2026","publicationDate":"2026-10-29","eventDate":null,"sourceName":"NetApp Docs","sourceLabel":"Known limitations in AI Data Engine","sourceUrl":"https://docs.netapp.com/us-en/ai-data-engine/release-notes/known-limitations.html","evidenceClass":"vendor-claim","outcomeClass":"cautionary","topics":["infrastructure","data-security","developers-agents","governance-procurement"],"finding":"NetApp's own release notes list AIDE limitations: single-node and multi-node deployments are separate with no migration path; forward proxies cannot be TLS-inspecting, SOCKS, PAC/WPAD, or use NTLM, Kerberos or client-certificate authentication, and proxies are rejected on air-gapped installs; policy-triggered actions are limited to permanent deletion and email notification; tags cannot be deleted or renamed; and the governed AI access (MCP) interface searches only by name prefix, file type and owner, so size/date/folder queries may return incomplete answers.","sledRelevance":"Directly relevant to government and university networks, which commonly use TLS-inspecting or authenticated proxies and sometimes air-gapped enclaves. The limits also bound claims that AI agents can reliably query governed data through MCP today.","evidence":"Vendor documentation of unsupported functionality; no performance or outcome data.","architectureImplications":"Choose single- vs multi-node at the start because there is no migration path; proxy design must match supported modes.","governanceImplications":"Only deletion or notification can be automated by policy, so retention and archive workflows remain manual; permanent tag definitions require naming governance up front.","securityPrivacyImplications":"Agencies whose security architecture requires TLS inspection or Kerberos/NTLM proxy authentication will need exceptions or alternative network paths; automated permanent deletion needs strong approval controls.","caveats":"Vendor-authored; limitations may change between releases. Page states it may not apply to every product version.","streamIds":["netapp"],"roles":{"sales":"Sales framing: use this page to set honest expectations before any AIDE conversation. Public-sector networks frequently rely on TLS-inspecting or Kerberos-authenticated proxies, which AIDE does not support, so qualify network architecture early. Do not sell agentic or MCP access as a complete query layer; NetApp documents that AI clients can search only by name prefix, file type and owner. Raising these limits early builds credibility with security and records stakeholders and avoids stalled pilots.","engineering":"Engineering framing: these are hard design constraints. Decide single- versus multi-node up front because there is no migration path. Map the agency proxy chain against supported modes and plan an exception or direct egress if TLS inspection or NTLM/Kerberos is mandatory. Test MCP queries that matter to users, including date and folder filters, and document where results are incomplete. Treat automated permanent deletion as a privileged action requiring separate approval.","delivery":"Delivery framing: build the limitations into the plan rather than discovering them in production. Add a network-architecture checkpoint, a tag-naming standard because tags cannot be renamed or deleted, and a policy-action review because automation is limited to deletion and email. Communicate to records staff that archive and tagging workflows stay manual. Track the limitations page at each release and re-baseline the plan when items are removed."},"roleDetails":{"sales":{"customerProblem":"Buyers may expect agentic data access and policy automation that the current release does not support.","stakeholders":["CISO / network security","Records manager","IT infrastructure lead","AI program lead"],"discoveryQuestions":["Does your network require TLS-inspecting or authenticated proxies?","Do you need air-gapped deployment?","Which automated retention actions are required?"],"valueHypothesis":"Early qualification against documented limits reduces failed pilots and rework.","potentialEngagement":"Pre-deployment architecture fit review against the limitations list.","unsupportedClaims":["Complete MCP query coverage for agents","Automated archive or tagging by policy","Seamless scale-up from single to multi-node"]},"engineering":{"fit":"Fit only where proxy and network design match supported modes.","architectureIntegration":"Single- or multi-node deployment chosen at install; forward proxy without TLS inspection; MCP access for AI clients.","prerequisites":["Proxy architecture review","Deployment-size decision","Tag taxonomy"],"constraints":["No single-to-multi-node migration","No TLS-inspecting, SOCKS, PAC or NTLM/Kerberos proxies","No proxy on air-gapped installs","MCP search filters limited"],"security":"Permanent deletion policies require privileged approval and audit; proxy exceptions need security sign-off.","proofOfValue":["Test MCP queries by date/folder for completeness","Validate install through the agency proxy","Dry-run a deletion policy in a sandbox"]},"delivery":{"work":"Incorporate documented limits into design, runbooks and user communications.","dependencies":["Network security team","Records management","NetApp release notes"],"ownership":"IT infrastructure owns the platform; records management owns policy definitions.","skillsAdoption":"Admins trained on tag permanence and policy limits; users told which queries are reliable.","governanceCheckpoints":["Network design review","Tag taxonomy approval","Deletion policy approval"],"acceptanceCriteria":["Proposed: installation passes through approved network path without security exceptions beyond those signed off","Proposed: documented list of reliable and unreliable MCP query types","Proposed: zero unapproved automated deletions in pilot"],"risks":["Accidental permanent deletion","Proxy incompatibility delaying deployment","User trust loss from incomplete agent answers"]}},"retrievedAt":"2026-10-30T03:05:02Z","enrichedAt":"2026-10-30T03:12:55Z","enrichmentBasis":"retrieved source","accessibilityWorkforceImplications":"Interpretation: staff skills in storage, identity and security operations are the main workforce dependency; no accessibility findings in the source.","procurementImplications":"Interpretation: buy against documented, testable requirements and acceptance tests rather than vendor maxima.","operatingModelImplications":"Interpretation: ongoing operations sit with central or departmental IT storage teams; no change in operating model is reported by the source.","sourceVerification":{"openedUrl":"https://docs.netapp.com/us-en/ai-data-engine/release-notes/known-limitations.html","referenceExcerpt":"When you create a policy, the available automated actions are limited to permanent deletion and email notification.","promptVersion":"sled-research-v4.0","model":null,"basis":"agent-reported inspection"}}}]}